Russia's Identity in International Relations by Raymond Taras

Author:Raymond Taras [Taras, Raymond]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9781138816787
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2014-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

Putin's innovations on collective identity

In Putin's addresses representation of Russia as similar and equal to other ‘powerful, economically advanced and influential states of the world’ is the major frame for collective self-identification vis-à-vis ‘the West’. It constitutes his major innovation when compared to the models of collective identity that dominated Russian public discourse in the 1990s. The idea of Russia's similarity to its Significant Other traditionally employed the metaphor of pupilhood: multiple variants of ‘Westernism’ explained the differences between Russia and ‘the other Europe’ by invoking its supposed backwardness. They tended to represent it as a ‘young’ and ‘talented pupil’ who succeeds quickly. This metaphor allows Russia to be fixed not only in terms of similarity (its ‘success’), but also differences (its ‘backwardness’).

It is significant that Putin's addresses refer to both aspects of this metaphor. On the one hand, he records the fact that the distance between Us and the Other has been cut: progress in integration into the world economy (Putin 2001, 2002), status of ‘full-fledged member of the Club of Eight made up of the most advanced states in the world’ (Putin 2003), and so on. On the other hand, Putin critically acknowledges differences that do not yet allow Russia to be equated with the ‘advanced states’: the existence of an economic lag that ‘pushes Russia down to the level of third world countries’ (Putin 2000), and the need to overcome this lag (Putin 2002). Though such statements are uncommon, the descriptive terms used for comparisons between Russia and its Other emphasize the relative character of these differences.

Still, the metaphor of ‘pupilhood’ implies a hidden trap. As Iver Neumann has argued, the notion of Russia as pupil supposes that it increasingly becomes more similar to Us and simultaneously develops into less ‘other’ (Neumann 1999: 107). If that is the case, then the question arises how long distinctions may continue to be viewed as constitutive traits. As Neumann persuasively demonstrates, the discourse of European identity holds differences between Europe and Russia to be temporal rather than spatial. That is, Russia is seen as a country that is always at a certain stage of Europeanization (Neumann 1999: 111). When needed, discourse redefines the context in order to maintain this image of Russia. It is important to ask, then, whether such an approach fits the strategy of Russia itself?

The model of collective self-identification constructed in the speeches of Putin suggests a categorically negative answer to this question. Its central aspect is the claim for actual (not only potential) similarity between Russia and ‘the most advanced states in the world’. In Putin's addresses this claim was substantiated not only by referring to recent achievements — membership in the G-8, significant economic development, etc. — and cooperation in an anti-terrorist coalition. He also iterated the European identity of Russia (Putin 2005), recognition of ‘our contribution to the development of an all-European and world culture’ (Putin 2007b), and emphasis on the ‘civilizational mission’ of Russia ‘on the Euro-Asian continent’ (Putin 2005). Furthermore, Putin highlighted how the problems that Russia faces today are familiar to other countries (Putin 2000, 2006).

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